Why Imam Khomeini Became the Imam

TEHRAN (Iran News) Answering why others did not become the Imam is neither simple nor entirely possible, because many of those who didn’t become Imam were actually preparing the ground for him to become who he was. At the same time, it’s undeniable that many others failed to recognize him, were preoccupied with their own narrow expectations of religion, or let their worldly desires shape their religious understanding.

In other words, the uniqueness of Imam Khomeini plays a central role here. The fact that the Imam looked at religion through the lens of the Prophet’s mission, while others behaved like followers of the Prophet’s companions—passive, submissive, and sometimes seeking ease—is, in my view, the heart of the matter.

Imam Khomeini saw humiliation and exile not as misfortunes, but as integral to his mission, and he prepared his chest to face them. The foundation of what made him who he was lay in his perception of duty—awakening the people. This was the very duty the Holy Prophet received under the phrase “clear delivery (balagh-e mubin)”, and Imam Khomeini did the same. The false front opposing him crumbled, as he put it, the moment the chant “Allahu Akbar” (God Is Great) rose—the phrase did its work.

One must understand that the Pahlavi regime, even with the support of the royal court, never held all the power in Iran. In fact, they were more aware of this reality than anyone else. From the moment Reza Shah was chosen by the British due to the country’s instability—to serve their interests and create security for them—up to the era when modernization clashed with traditional and native Iranian culture, and the regime responded to the people’s attachment to tradition with bayonets and massacres, any thoughtful person could see that continuing British goals in Iran meant pursuing Reza Shah’s path under the guise of modernity.

Furoughi, acting as a British agent, legitimized and implemented this plan, putting Mohammad Reza on the throne—a throne that essentially served only as a watchdog to ensure the Iranian people wouldn’t challenge foreign interests.

Look at the Tehran Conference: the leaders of the major world powers—Soviet Russia, Britain, and America—held a meeting in Tehran without even informing the Shah and made decisions about Iran’s future. Or take the Shah’s own memoirs, where he writes: “My mother asked me why I was upset, and I told her: for example, I’m the king of this country, and yet without my permission, the Americans command our air force to go help them in Vietnam and fight the Vietnamese people.” Or when, during the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman, the British ordered the Shah to deploy Iran’s helicopter forces to crush the rebels, and he complied without question.

Analyzing the political climate between 1963 and the years 1977–78 shows that the country was effectively controlled by three major powers with varying shares. These figures may help to better grasp the distribution of power: the Shah and the royal court held no more than 20% of the power. The remaining 80% was divided between post-1953 America—with its formal advisory dominance over Iran—and Britain, which, although less than the U.S., still had significant control through its anti-Soviet communication network, influence in Iran’s intelligence service, SAVAK, and Freemason networks.

In my view, of the 80% of power beyond the court, about 50% belonged to the Americans, and about 30% to the British. Minor powers like France, the Soviet Union, the Zionist regime, and the Baha’is—through their parties at the time—also held small 1–2% shares and shouldn’t be ignored.

This power estimate is what enabled the Imam to be exiled. It was this understanding of power distribution that made the Imam’s critical stance toward the Shah and the court’s subservience to foreign powers so influential in the minds of the people. It was this very lack of independence that resonated with the Shi’a Iranian spirit of Ashura and Imam Husein (AS). The Imam, knowing his people well, identified this emotional chord and struck it from his pulpit in Najaf, Iraq.

His strategy focused on the people, presenting Pure Islam—an Islam capable of shaping the country’s governance. The Provisional Government after the Revolution failed to grasp the Founder’s vision, and in their negotiations with Brzezinski in Algiers tried to befriend America, which led to the embassy takeover—seen as the den of spies. The Imam seized the moment and transformed the successful struggle against the royal court into a victorious battle against the remaining 50% of power in Iran, thereby shifting the fight from domestic tyranny to anti-colonial resistance—a struggle that intelligently continues to this day.

Without a doubt, the indirect negotiations with Trump’s team in Oman will mark another golden chapter in confronting the U.S. And Imam Khomeini’s becoming the Imam will ultimately be demonstrated through his close bond with the people and his life-giving leadership in securing true independence—culminating in the continued guidance of his worthy successor, the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei (may his shadow be extended).

Certainly, the time will come to confront the remaining 30% of power—those who have taken hold of the country’s mismanagement—and after this victory, the groundwork will be laid for the reappearance of the Divine Proof, Imam Mahdi (may God hasten his reappearance), God willing.