Outcomes of Al-Aqsa Storm Operation
Outcomes of Al-Aqsa Storm Operation
 The Al-Aqsa Storm Operation on October 7, 2023 - or the 15th of Mehr 1402 in the Persian calendar - carried out by the Palestinian resistance movement Hamas proved to be a transformative event that reshaped the landscape of Palestine and West Asia. 

TEHRAN (Iran News) – The Al-Aqsa Storm Operation on October 7, 2023 – or the 15th of Mehr 1402 in the Persian calendar – carried out by the Palestinian resistance movement Hamas proved to be a transformative event that reshaped the landscape of Palestine and West Asia.

This significant event has given rise to various outcomes, and in this commentary, I will categorize and outline some of them on three levels: Palestinian/Israeli, regional, and international.
1. Internal level

1.1. Israeli perspective

1. The Israeli deterrence collapsed, compelling the Zionist regime to reconstruct and reinforce its military capabilities, resorting to extreme measures in utilizing its military resources in the Gaza war.

2. The extensive dimensions of the October 7 operation intensified the sense of insecurity among Israeli settlers, once again placing them in the midst of existential crises.

3. The myth of the invincibility of the Israeli army and effective intelligence services, along with decades of propaganda and brainwashing attempts, crumbled.

4. The central narrative of Israel’s ruling right-wingers over the past two decades, claiming that the Palestinian issue had been sidelined, was entirely debunked.

5. The crisis and war strengthened the unity of Zionist society, albeit at the surface level. However, beneath the surface, it laid the groundwork for heightened conflicts and divisions that emerged immediately after the Gaza war.

6. Benjamin Netanyahu faced one of the toughest tests in his political career, and the Gaza war most likely became the final major chapter in Netanyahu’s political legacy.

7. It intensified the right-wing extremist coalition’s harsh and anti-Palestinian rhetoric amid the demands of war. Yet, at a deeper level, this created opportunities for the weakening of the political position and resurgence of the center-right political faction in Israel.

8. The perspective of the Zionists/Zionist regime, particularly its right-wing faction, became more apparent and fortified toward the conflict with Palestinians.

1.2. Palestinian perspective

9. The resilience and proactive initiatives of the Palestinian nation and the ideals of Resistance in the face of Zionist occupation reinforced their exceptional and unparalleled role in the history of confronting the Zionist occupation.

10. The popularity of Hamas skyrocketed among displaced Palestinians (the 1967-occupied territories of East Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip) and even among Palestinians in exile, positioning it strongly at the forefront of leadership.

11. The position of the Islamic Jihad movement in Palestine as the second effective resistance movement in the Palestinian arena became solidified, and its solidarity and collaboration with Hamas became more pronounced than ever.

12. The Palestinian Authority faced one of its toughest trials, exposing its unpopularity and ineffectiveness in public perception, especially with the emergence of a new generation of leaders and prominent figures.

13. The Palestinian national liberation movement, Fatah, faced a new challenge in its leadership, revealing the weakening of its official leadership and the rise of a new generation and prominent figures, some of whom were imprisoned or exiled.

14. The role of Palestinian Christians alongside Palestinian Muslims, as well as certain historically leftist Palestinian groups like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) were emphasized, intensifying their cooperation and solidarity with the Islamic resistance movements in the face of the occupation.

15. The steadfastness of the people in Gaza, their refusal to surrender their land, and resistance against forced displacement highlighted a generational shift in comparison to the initial phases of the occupation and the Nakba.

2. Regional level

16. The importance of the Palestinian issue in regional developments and the necessity of achieving the minimum aspirations of the Palestinian people were underscored as prerequisites for any new process or transformation. It also became evident that bypassing this issue and promoting one-dimensional ideas based on normalization is not feasible.

17. The influence of Iran and the resistance forces known as the Axis of Resistance became more evident, making it clear that no regional process could be sustainable or stabilizing without the collaboration of Iran and the Axis of Resistance.

18. The concept, nature, and level of coordination and collaboration between Iran and the Axis of Resistance faced challenges and examination, revealing their genuine dimensions in a significant real-life experience.

19. The push to normalize relations between Saudi Arabia and other Arab/Islamic nations with Israel hit a pause. This break is temporary and depends on upcoming developments, particularly the final outcomes of the Gaza war.

20. Qatar’s role as a regional intermediary, engaging with both sides of the Gaza conflict simultaneously, has seen relative strengthening.

21. The Al Jazeera satellite network solidified its influential presence as a leading media outlet, overshadowing mainstream Western and international media in shaping and deepening public opinion.

22. Turkey’s regional prominence decreased as it rejected a mediatory role (given Turkey’s size and power compared to a mediator like Qatar). Furthermore, challenges emerged, testing its relations with both sides of the Gaza conflict. Meanwhile, Turkey’s societal capacities and the role of its civil society in supporting Palestine became evident, emphasizing the need to strengthen civil society within the framework of Iran’s national policies, both domestically and internationally.

23. Historical gaps between Arab governments and the Arab public deepened, highlighting a significant disparity between Arab public opinions and their governments’ policies.

24. The dormant volcano within Arab societies reignited, and the simmering anger flared to such levels that, sooner or later, it will emerge, reminiscent of the events of 2011 in the region and the Arab uprisings. (The events are underway).

25. Yemen, with the distinctive role of the Ansarullah resistance group and Sana’a, transformed into a major player in West Asia for the first time in the history of the Palestinian struggle. The popularity of Ansarullah among Yemenis and in the Islamic world relatively strengthened, posing challenges and serious questions to the dominant media narrative and the official Arab system’s portrayal against this movement, particularly by Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

26. The active role of Shia movements in Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq in providing practical support to Gaza elevated them to the forefront of the Islamic Ummah’s brave forces. This has challenged the unilateral sectarian-based narratives and psychological operations of the dominant media and the official Arab system against Iran and its allies.

27. More favorable conditions emerged for the transition from power-based politics to legitimate authority or influence (recognized by rival actors) as a vital necessity for enhancing Iran’s regional influence.

3. International level

28. The occupation of Palestine by the Zionist movement and the unresolved Palestinian national issue once again become a global concern. With its practical results, it inevitably moved to the forefront of the global powers’ agenda and international politics.

29. All the positive image-building and narratives constructed around Israel during the famous Madrid and Oslo peace processes shattered. The real face of Israel, based on occupation, crimes, ethnic cleansing, state and institutionalized terrorism, become apparent to the world.

30. Global public opinion rallied to an unprecedented extent in support of the Palestinian people and their right to liberation from occupation. Some well-known political scientists, such as John Mearsheimer, believe that currently 95% of global public opinion is against Israel and supportive of the Palestinians.

31. The harsh reality of the United States and the West’s multi-standard, oppressive, and brutal politics, coupled with the deceptive nature of their democracy and human rights slogans, has become unmistakable. This revelation has quelled numerous doubts and questions among both the masses and elites of Iran and the global community.

32. Shifted the media attention of the United States and other global powers to the long-neglected issue of peace, the two-state solution, and the essential establishment of an independent Palestinian state. If this attention evolves from mere rhetoric to action, it will face various obstacles, especially the structural and genuine challenges ingrained within the social fabric of Israeli society. These challenges arise from the occupation and denial of the existence of the Palestinian nation by the Zionist governing system, as witnessed in the experiences of the Madrid and Oslo Peace Processes.

33. The conditions resulting from the war inevitably diminished the gaps between the United States and Israel. But this gap will gradually increase. In such a situation the United States and the West will push for the strengthening of the so-called moderate and secular center-right movement at the expense of religious far-rightists.

34. Changes in external conditions reshaped the dynamics of the Ukraine war. With the United States and Europe diverting their focus from this conflict and redirecting significant political and strategic attention toward the Palestinian crisis, there has been a temporary positive transformation in Russia’s position in this war.
35. The inefficiency and failure of the United Nations in addressing Israel’s acts of genocide and mass killings, alongside the regime’s threats to peace and international security, are now more apparent than ever. This highlights the need, as previously discussed, for a reevaluation of the UN’s mechanisms and operations.

Hossein Jaberi Ansari is the former Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson and deputy foreign minister for Arab and African Affairs

  • source : Tehrantimes