TEHRAN (Iran News) – The condition for Joe Biden, the newly-elected president coming into power in the U.S., is by far more difficult than in 2016 when Donald Trump took power in the U.S. because some decisions like taking stance on the JCPOA had been taken even before Trump coming to power and it was evident but Biden with some promises nurturing in his mind that he might return to the JCPOA finds it inapplicable after electing his executive team regardless of the presence of the Zionists surrounding him.

Regardless of the issue of the JCPOA, Biden Administration is facing a large number of challenges. Bipolarization of the country after the presidential election has made the U.S. face different challenges like national security, an uneven condition in managing the coronavirus pandemic, and even earmarking budget for resolving financial crisis ahead of the country because simultaneously, the federal budgets due to the infrastructural and public health crisis are in critical condition.

Reacting to these challenges, a growing will is seen in the public for reconsideration in the U.S. global role. It is clearly visible that Biden does not seek display of power, and with the domestic plights, he prefers first to focus on the domestic issue and then on the overseas issues.

In this regards, the American Rand Corporation think tank in an almost realistic report writes, “According to one of the options, the U.S. by adopting a realistic self-restraint has taken a constructive approach regarding the other powers because it has decreased its military and aggressive presence and it has preferred to end some of its security commitments so that it could once again reach agreements in a better condition.”

To understand this option better by the public and the U.S. policy-makers, the writers of this report in the think tank have explained how the U.S. security policies under a grand restraint strategy change in the key regions and have raised many important unanswerable questions, and they have explained, elaborated and analyzed the next steps of this option and its political consequences, and have also warned the risks of the introversion strategy.

The writers of the report have come to this conclusion that regional policies, under the grand strategy of prioritization depending on the level of the U.S. interests and the risk of the dominance of a powerful country in the region, will be variable.

Due to China’s considerable military capability, advocates of reconsideration policy in hegemony due to the domestic woes in the U.S. want the country to have a more military role in East Asia for protecting the U.S. hegemony against China than other regions.

Theories and evaluations of pro-restraint stance and the strategy of prioritizing the threats have been different from the theories and assessments of the policy-makers who have formed the grand U.S. restraint strategy since the Cold War era. On the whole, the intellectuals in this political and military think tank believe in diplomacy for settling the conflict in the interest, and in defending the vital U.S. interests, and they encourage other countries to keep their superiority and military power. They strongly believe that if the grand restraint strategy has been adopted, the U.S. will have a smaller army and its overseas commitments and troop deployments will be decreased, and using military force will face more hurdles than the current policies. So the country in a short time has to give up most of its stances in alignment with its political partners. Being aware of certain consequences in making decisions regarding this grand strategy from one region to the other region will be variable depending on the level of the U.S. interests and the risk of the hegemony of power in the region.

Advocates of this strategy seek a more constructive approach with the U.S.’s current rivals like Russia and Iran. The U.S. strategy in the Asia Pacific region which is considered as the most important region has divided the supporters of the change in the strategy. They believe the emergence of a strong country in Asia, Europe, or in the Persian Gulf will limit the vital interests of the U.S. or even threatens it but they have not offered and transparent and far-sighted instructions to the politicians inside the government or their allies in the world to set a prospective for important decisions and ways of rising of this threat.

To present more accurate policies in each region, think tanks and intellectuals, and even intelligence services should make its realm stronger by preparing a comprehensive policy and have double analysis. They believe time will play a key role in presenting the strategy of the game. They emphasize that the decision-making structure in the administration has not even reached a relative convergence to link the prospect of resolving the internal problems along with a lasting policy in direction of protecting a structure to its allies abroad.

The American Rand Corporation has paid less attention to this point that the trend of the U.S. hegemony in introversion for showing and magnifying the power needs a heavy budget and the U.S. in the current condition has no way but to solve its domestic problems through decreasing military budget with the dramatic application.

The danger of humiliation against China in West Asia is understandable for all political-defense experts in the U.S. but the Administration’s heavy and growing debts and the need for adopting domestic détente policies have made limited and even impossible the decision making between two indisputable actualities for setting the strategy.