The JCPOA Experience: Useful in Oman

TEHRAN (Iran News) Because the events that occurred during the drafting and implementation of the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) divided Iranian society into two distinct camps.

Supporters of the JCPOA believed it was a way to open up closed doors in the economy. Beyond economics, they viewed it as a gateway for the West to enter Iran’s internal environment—strengthening the foundations of secularism in the country and creating a more conducive environment for deals with Western companies.

On the other hand, opponents—who were more concerned with preserving the Islamic Republic and the Revolution—argued that the JCPOA would dry up the roots of religion in Iran. Supporters of the JCPOA, in turn, labeled and mocked them as “the worried ones” (delvapasan).

The failure of the JCPOA—coupled with regret over its apparent success—fueled a cancerous attack on the Revolution and religion, further deepening the divide between the two camps in the country. In 2018 (1397), Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the agreement essentially rendered the JCPOA a useless document. Today, the stigma of it marks the foreheads of Ali Larijani, the Parliament during his term, and the pro-Western government of Hassan Fereydoun (Rouhani). It evokes memories of the Anglo-Saxon historiography of the Constitutional Era and figures such as Taghi Zadeh and Vosough al-Dowleh.

It is very important to evaluate and understand what actions led to the JCPOA not becoming a successful experience. Even nearly ten years after the start of negotiations in 2015 until now in 2025 (1404), debates, analyses, and arguments about it continue within the country. This demands a deep understanding from the perspective of subservient thinking.

Perhaps the first negative aspect of the JCPOA’s media portrayal was that expectations for it were raised hundreds or perhaps thousands of times beyond its actual benefits.

Hassan Fereydoun’s (Rouhani’s) government was forced to exaggerate the benefits of the JCPOA thousands of times to defend it. But its failure and the exposure of Europe’s and America’s collusion with the Zionist regime soon proved otherwise. The JCPOA became a full-blown sedition against the people, the Revolution, and religion—even among the most underprivileged sectors of society, it lost credibility.

Critics mocked the “exaggerated promises” of the JCPOA, and public opinion gradually joined in with the ridicule.

On the other hand, the political faction supporting the JCPOA tried to reduce it to a campaign slogan for the 2017 (1396) presidential election, further turning the JCPOA into a divisive tool in internal political strife. This greatly contributed to the sedition and further weakened the agreement.

Let us not forget how Mohammad Javad Zarif was turned into a manufactured hero by the same group of New Yorkers aligned with Velayati from previous foreign ministry administrations. Promoting him as a potential presidential candidate turned the JCPOA from a national treaty into an electoral pitch. Repeating this scenario with Abbas Araghchi would be alarming, misleading, provocative, and based on false premises—though without a doubt, Araghchi will never have the capacity to become a presidential candidate. His contradictory statements in Parliament and the media, as well as his alignment with Zarif, have left a less-than-clean image. Even Kamal Kharrazi’s invitation for him to join the Strategic Studies Center after Rouhani’s government raised many doubts.

Besides this, the JCPOA experience showed that the role of some intermediary countries had been exaggerated. For instance, Europe—especially the UK, which played a key role in shaping the JCPOA—had no real influence in securing Iran’s interests without the US. Including these countries in negotiations turned out to be useless, even harmful and deceptive. The “snapback” and trigger mechanism serve as the clearest evidence of this betrayal.

The JCPOA also showed that it could not function effectively if other political and social challenges were ignored. The spillover from these challenges soon tainted the JCPOA itself, making it subject to accusations of sedition. It became likened to the historical betrayals of the Qajar and Pahlavi dynasties.

In any case, the JCPOA experience demonstrated that achieving a successful foreign diplomatic agreement requires comprehensive, genuine domestic consensus, without partisan interests.

Such a consensus must be deeply rooted in realism. This lesson must now be applied to the upcoming negotiations in Oman—where Iran no longer has the former optimism. It approaches the talks with the bitter lessons of the JCPOA in mind and faces a party who openly claimed responsibility for assassinating Martyr Soleimani. Donald Trump harbors goals that are partly Zionist and partly Pan-Americanist.

Trump’s urgency to reach a deal in the Oman negotiations stems first from confronting his rival Democratic Party, which lost Iran during Jimmy Carter’s presidency. Secondly, it is about containing the ideology and roots of the resistance movement in the region, and breaking the barriers to Zionist political, social, and geographic expansion in West Asia. Of course, Trump is also counting on support from the Trumpists inside Iran who are rooting for his success in the negotiations.

Walsalam