Negotiating for the Sake of Negotiation

TEHRAN (Iran News) The outcome of the three-and-a-half-hour meeting, as presented to public opinion, was described by both sides as “desirable progress.” The very use of the word “desirable” itself gave rise to several concerns.

First – Confidentiality versus Transparency:

There is a specific international standard practice in sensitive negotiations whereby negotiating teams require a secure environment to bargain in order to reach a final framework, protected from media sensationalism and pressure from interest groups.

Domestic critics in Iran have repeatedly criticized the nuclear negotiating team for not publicly announcing certain technical details or side agreements (such as the level of cooperation with the Agency or expanded access). This issue has consistently turned into speculation, investigative reporting, and serious debate in Iran’s internal discussions.

However, it must be noted that confidentiality versus transparency in diplomacy creates a permanent tension between the need for secrecy to ensure successful negotiations and the obligation of transparency toward public opinion.

Negotiating teams usually argue that disclosing step-by-step details can weaken bargaining power.

A large portion of the negotiations concerned technical nuclear issues that were not understandable to the general public and likely required interpretation—ambiguities such as the disastrous experience of the snapback mechanism triggered by an unknown individual named Francesco as a result of the treacherous JCPOA.

Fundamental difference in legal and security status:

The Francesco case is generally defined within the framework of intelligence and security operations. Such cases typically have operational and espionage aspects, and the failure to disclose them in a timely manner often stems from legal violations or espionage concerns.

The main debate inside Iran concerns the transparency of the negotiating team toward governing institutions and the people; otherwise, Muscat or Geneva makes little difference in terms of preserving negotiation objectives.

Second – Concern about the unofficial status of the American team:

This raises the question of why we, too, did not introduce an unofficial team. When negotiations continue with an unofficial team—whose presence in talks of such importance has no documented proof beyond media announcements—while Marco Rubio and Vance, who are official members of Donald Trump’s government, each present their own interpretations of the negotiations in the media, ambiguity is inevitable.

Third – Contradictory signals in the media:

On one hand, we hear about the sensational transfer of warships and aircraft to the region during the negotiations, creating the impression that Iran has come to the negotiating table out of fear and compulsion, speaking under fire. On the other hand, there appears to be a retreat by Trump’s team from all previous propaganda and an acceptance of only one of the twelve previously declared conditions—limited solely to the nuclear issue.

This ambiguous retreat suggests that the American team’s intention may be to buy time and resolve its own domestic issues. Otherwise, what is the meaning of negotiations that are first indirect, second limited solely to the nuclear framework, and third conducted without the presence of official authorities?

Fourth – The authority to lift sanctions:

Everyone knows that lifting a large portion of the sanctions is essentially not within the direct authority of the U.S. government in a way that could serve as a basis for diplomatic bargaining. Before entering the session, the Iranian delegation should have clarified the scope of authority regarding sanctions relief under the Trump administration and brought the nation into alignment on this issue, so that we would not later be accused of negligent bargaining.

During the JCPOA era, the lengthy duration of negotiations led to accusations that the Foreign Ministry team was manufacturing trips for the sake of per diem benefits. Given Abbas Araghchi’s vague remarks after each session, there is concern that once again we may spend another two years in trip after trip, meeting after meeting, turning this chess game into a fruitless exercise and a mental preoccupation for nations both in the region and in Iran.

The Revolutionary Guard’s military maneuvers during the negotiations were a reciprocal response to America’s show of force. Indeed, it was a proper action, and certainly one of the IRGC or Army generals should have been present in the negotiating team so that diplomacy and the battlefield could be presented in a comprehensible balance. This did not happen—perhaps it will in later stages.

Based on past experience, including the JCPOA and these recent sessions, one might conclude that we approach negotiations with optimism, while the enemy pursues them with deceptive intent—using negotiations for the sake of negotiations and to shape the media environment in the domain of soft warfare. Ultimately, if an agreed-upon text is not published, this process could turn into a prolonged chess game marked by media checkmates and public negligence.

An example of such negligence was the revelation of Wendy Sherman’s Jewish identity and Abbas Araghchi’s inattention during the JCPOA negotiations, which portrayed our team as passive.

Sherman, in her book, refers to a sensitive moment during the final days of the Vienna negotiations. According to her account, after hours of exhausting talks and sleeplessness, just when an agreement seemed near, Araghchi once again raised an issue that had previously been settled. Sherman, extremely tired and angry, began shouting at Araghchi. She writes that her anger uncontrollably turned into tears. Sherman was shocked that she had cried in front of the Iranian team, but she believes that this display of sincerity and frustration led Araghchi and his team to retreat from their position.

Psychological operations have been, are, and will remain one of the enemy’s tactics. In conclusion, if I were the one conducting these negotiations, I would most certainly propose—and firmly insist—that the talks remain indirect but be conducted in front of the cameras of one hundred selected journalists from Iran, America, and the region, so that the unforgivable secrecy of the past would not be repeated.