22 Bahman This Year Was a Referendum

TEHRAN (Iran News) With their presence of 35 million people in cities and villages, they firmly and loudly responded to the opponents of the Islamic Republic—who generally advocate for a referendum—and proved that the Islamic system has not had, does not have, and will not have any significant opposition.

Essentially, the opponents of the Islamic Revolution outside Iran can be categorized. Based on available information, these groups mainly consist of small and highly scattered segments.

Some sources divide them into two general categories: political (using peaceful methods such as media and speeches) and armed (using terror and violence). However, a more common classification is based on ideological orientation, which I will address below in order of their level of activity and history.

New secular and constitutionalist coalitions (the most prominent recent group):

Inside and outside the country, they form a community of around one hundred thousand people. The most significant development has been the gathering of various factions of these tendencies around Reza Pahlavi and the “Solidarity Charter.” They are said to live off money stolen by Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and call for the dissolution of the IRGC and a referendum to change the system. This group represents the oldest segment of the opposition, seeking the return of the Pahlavi rule, with its core based in Los Angeles (such as the Tondar group).

Leftist and communist groups:

Including the Tudeh Party and especially Komala, which is active in Kurdistan. They have recently signed the Solidarity Charter to align with monarchists. Like the monarchists, their numbers do not exceed one hundred thousand. They are often described as deceptive intelligence-linked organizations, although Komala funds some of its activities through its own revenues.

The Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO) (referred to as “Hypocrites”):

The most controversial group. Due to fighting alongside Saddam against the Islamic Republic of Iran during the 1980s, they are considered the most hated group inside Iran and lack any popular base. Although they have been removed from the U.S. and European terrorist lists, their ISIS-like violent approach was reportedly displayed during recent unrest. The seed of hatred planted within them is described as incomprehensible and beyond analysis, and they are accused of brutal behavior toward Iran’s religious and prayer-observing people.

Civil and labor networks:

Including Nobel Prize winner Shirin Ebadi and dozens of small human rights organizations in Europe and the United States, mainly focused on “Woman, Life, Freedom” and justice-seeking efforts. Their numbers are said not to reach even 30,000. They support themselves financially, have media platforms, and have gained influence within party and human rights structures. Their goal is described as misrepresenting the people-oriented path of the system, particularly by relying on feminism.

The Baha’is:

Described as the most organized group opposing the Islamic system, with an almost religious approach. They are said to have their strongest source of cohesion in Israel, with alleged deep Mossad influence. Their establishment is attributed to Britain as a means of ideological confrontation with Shi’ism and to create deviation in Shiite messianic beliefs. They are described as the wealthiest anti-revolutionary movement, with a larger following than the other groups.

Overall, this categorization suggests that foreign intervention has caused ideological divisions among these groups. They are deeply polarized over the issue of supporting military attacks. The majority oppose U.S. and Israeli attacks and the fragmentation of Iran, while a minority (including some monarchists, the MKO, and supporters of Shirin Ebadi) have at times been willing to coordinate with foreign powers against the Islamic Republic.

An important point is that these groups are often highly scattered, lack cohesion, and suffer from mutual distrust. They have no effective connection with developments inside Iran and essentially cannot be called fighters against the system.

Based on this analysis, the Islamic Republic can be considered to lack any significant opposition. If their voices are heard in foreign media and cyberspace, they are mostly seen as advancing the hostility of Western intelligence agencies against our country—something clearly evident to the Iranian nation.

This year, three “Days of God” falling on the 22nd of each month—22 Dey condemning the unrest, 22 Bahman renewing commitment to the ideals of the Islamic Revolution and national solidarity, and, God willing, 22 Esfand on Quds Day—have shown and will continue to show outstanding manifestations of the Iranian nation’s power, disappointing the bloodthirsty enemies of the Iranian people.