The E3’s Entry into the JCPOA: A Strategic Mistake

TEHRAN (Iran News) The United Nations Security Council, despite the opposition of China and Russia, with nine negative votes led by the United States, Britain, and France, rejected the proposed resolution confirming Iran’s compliance with its nuclear commitments. This formally paved the way for the restoration of all UN Security Council sanctions that had been temporarily suspended under the JCPOA, and now Europe is able to activate the “Snapback” mechanism and pull the trigger of the weapon aimed at the Iranian nation.

Former President Hassan Rouhani and his team of advisers—later known as the architects of the JCPOA and the self-proclaimed heroes of diplomacy—dragged the three European countries, France, Britain, and Germany, into the Iranian nuclear file with the repetitive illusion of leaning on Europe and the fantasy of creating a rift between the European troika and the United States. They hoped they could use Britain’s goodwill toward themselves and the influence of these three countries to prevent Iran’s case from being referred to the Security Council at that time.

With the involvement of the European troika in Iran’s nuclear negotiations, two key meetings, known as the “Saadabad Summit” and the “Paris Summit,” were held.

The Saadabad Summit was convened on October 21, 2003 (29 Mehr 1382 in the Iranian calendar) as a joint meeting of the foreign ministers of the three European countries and the Iranian delegation in Tehran. According to the statement issued, Iran agreed to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for inspections of its facilities and, as a voluntary and temporary measure to verify and prove the peaceful nature of its nuclear activities, suspended the operation of its gas centrifuges.

Britain and France, in return, committed to preventing Iran’s case from being referred to the UN Security Council.

Existing documentation of the performance of Hassan Rouhani’s team at that time shows how deeply optimistic the Iranian negotiators were toward the West. They expected—contrary to all historical evidence and even their own three decades of experience in international affairs—that they could mobilize Europe to restrain the United States!

At that time, I wrote in an article: We sent children to war, Unaware of the sharp teeth of the whale.

The commitments made by the E3 at Saadabad turned out to be hollow, and Iran’s case was eventually referred to the Security Council. Excessive trust in the promises of the European countries and the IAEA, and the granting of concrete and tangible concessions by the Iranian side in exchange for vague and deferred European commitments, resulted in Saadabad being added to Iran’s list of diplomatic lessons. That summit was consigned to history as a prelude to Europe’s growing interference in Iran’s nuclear file.

Rouhani himself writes on page 599 of his book National Security and Nuclear Diplomacy:

“Europe had committed in the Tehran negotiations that as long as the Natanz facility had not resumed activity, it would prevent the referral of the nuclear file to the Security Council. However, in February 2006 (Bahman 1384), the nuclear file was referred to the Security Council while Natanz was still under suspension. Therefore, Europe had violated its commitment.”

In reality, the European troika, which since World War II had never defied the United States in any major global issue and was unable to take any significant action without U.S. approval, could never have been a mediator—let alone a savior—of Iran’s nuclear case!

Europe, which did not even have sufficient standing in the eyes of the United States to participate in the recent Muscat negotiations, was, through the actions of Hassan Rouhani and his advisers, granted the authority to interfere in Iran’s nuclear affairs and became the legal inheritor of the snapback mechanism for reinstating the sanctions of Resolution 1929 against Iran.

It is astonishing that Rouhani’s foreign minister and chief negotiator in the JCPOA went even further, expanding the role of the Europeans and even becoming a partner in the West’s plan to undermine the veto power of China and Russia.

The Saadabad Agreement was the first chapter in the turbulent history of Europe’s involvement in Iran’s nuclear negotiations—a book that now seems to be reaching its end with the impending activation of the snapback mechanism.

Excessive optimism and the assumption of these countries’ independence in decision-making caused heavy losses for the Iranian people over these months.

Hassan Rouhani must hold himself more than anyone else accountable for elevating Europe’s status and granting decision-making weight to the European troika—nations that are subservient and dependent on the United States. By now, he should have realized that Britain’s goodwill toward his team did nothing to solve the country’s problems.