Europe Withdraws the Snapback Letter

TEHRAN (Iran News) Did Abbas Araqchi’s negotiations in Cairo with the head of the Agency yield results that carried enough weight to be considered equal to—or even more significant than—the withdrawal of the snapback letter?

That making the implementation of agreements with Grossi conditional on the European troika’s retreat from carrying out the snapback is certainly an attractive way of framing the matter.

And, without a doubt, it would serve to restore Europe’s identity.

Although the likelihood of this happening in the short term is very low, it is not impossible. The analysis can be divided into several aspects:

Reasons why Europe prefers to maintain its current stance and avoid triggering the snapback:

Firstly; fear that by pulling the snapback trigger, they would hand the U.S. a tool, and if Washington sparks an oil war in the Persian Gulf, Europe would bear the cost of soaring oil prices.

Secondly; Europe has allies in Iran who do not want to face trial and prison sentences for failing to uphold Articles 36 and 37 of the JCPOA.

Thirdly; if Araqchi manages to impose his condition on Europe—even superficially—it would naturally hand Europe’s allies in Iran a new tool for political propaganda, useful in deceiving voters again in elections.

Fourthly; after being humiliated by Trump at the negotiating table, Europe came to resemble a henchman—“a lion without a mane, tail, or claws.” By withdrawing the snapback letter, it would regain a sense of identity.

Fifthly; activating the snapback would mean the certain death of the JCPOA and destroy years of European diplomacy. By withdrawing the snapback letter, there remains some hope that the JCPOA could be revitalized by figures like Rouhani or, with the help of Pezeshkian, infused with new life.

We should note that Europe’s position on the snapback has not been built upon a solid legal foundation. Both China and Russia have pointed this out. Retreating from this stance carries the risk of the issue failing to gain approval in the UN Security Council.

Most importantly, triggering the snapback would amount to declaring total diplomatic war against Iran, eliminating any possibility of negotiation or containing Iran’s nuclear program through diplomacy.

And since Europeans are concerned that more sanctions could escalate instability in the Middle East—and possibly provoke a strong Iranian reaction—pulling the snapback trigger will never truly be desirable for Europe.

Now, given these considerations, the design of the Cairo meeting could be seen as an initiative by the European troika—both to curb American threats and to prevent Europe from being further isolated by the risks of triggering the snapback. Under these conditions, the prospect of Europe withdrawing the snapback letter appears more likely and more realistic.