Following is the text of the interview:

What is the history of the using of sanction in US foreign policy?

Sanctions have been part of US foreign policy since the beginning of the Republic.  They’ve been applied against a range of other states and actors, including countries that are now firm US allies like the United Kingdom. To this end, it is worth noting that sanctions have also been a part of many foreign policies. The difference now, I think, is the degree to which the United States can operationalize its global economic position to implement sanctions.  But, arguably, other superpowers — for their time — had similar power.

What is the importance of sanction in US foreign policy?

It is an important tool in the conduct of foreign policy for creating leverage to resolve problems.  All countries seek to build leverage as they enter into negotiations or deal with conflicts.  Sometimes, the leverage is through sanctions.  Other times, it is through violence or building up coalitions of partner countries.

Which preconditions needed for success of sanctions in US foreign policy?

In my opinion, the conditions are: 1) a clear, well-articulated strategy with identified objectives; 2) a clear understanding of the target of sanctions, its vulnerabilities, and its interests so that sanctions can be tailored to their purpose; 3) international support and, better, cooperation in implementing sanctions; and, 4) a clear linkage to negotiations so that the leverage generated by sanctions can be applied toward a diplomatic settlement.

For success of sanctions on Iran, you have emphasized on international support and consensus. Do you think without the international support, US imposing sanctions on Iran will not be successful?

I think that it is much more difficult.  I think the United States can generate pressure on Iran and has already done so.  I think it is harder to see this pressure adding up to a resolution of the problems the United States identified in choosing to impose those sanctions, in no small part because Iran may feel that it is unnecessary to respond to only the concerns of one country and an adversary at that.

Dollar is a useful instrument in imposing sanction by US. what is your opinion about this? Can dollar remain as a useful instrument in imposing sanction by US in the future?

The dollar is less a useful instrument than it is a resource that countries, banks, and companies want to use.  By threatening to withhold access to the dollar (and, more importantly, access to the United States economy), the United States can make it harder to resist its policy choices.  The key factor in its continuing utility is the degree to which people, companies, and banks want to do business in the United States and how ready they are to walk away from that in order to do business with US-sanctioned targets.  Thus far, we are not seeing that in large scale.  As time moves on, we may.

Regardless of the result, INSTEX is a try by Iran and other countries for evading the SWIFT and dollar base mechanism’s role. Do you think that dollar based mechanism will be weakened in the future?

It may, but it won’t be because of INSTEX.  INSTEX may work or it may not, but the value of the dollar — and, again, more importantly, the value of the US economy and access to it — remains high for international business.  So long as that remains important to international business, it will be hard for foreign companies, banks, and governments to ignore US policy demands.

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Following is the text of the interview:

Do you think President Trump can refer to trigger mechanism (Because the US violated the JCPOA and has not this jurisdiction)?

I think that there is a plausible legal justification for the United States to trigger the mechanism.  The terms of the JCPOA and UNSCR 2231 refer to the United States as a “participating government” in different ways.  In the JCPOA, it means what is plainly written: that the United States is a party to the agreement and believes itself to be.  That is something the United States stopped doing in May 2018.

UNSCR 2231, though, could be read as saying that “participating government” is only short-hand for “this list of states.”  This is a common legal approach to avoid having lots of the same words used over and over again.

Some have suggested that this means the United States could trigger the mechanism.

I tend to think that this is a bit irrelevant since the mechanism is also dependent on states agreeing to abide by the terms of the UNSC resolutions that would come back into force.  If this is seen as a bit of legal trickery, then the credibility and integrity of the UNSC’s own decisions will be undermined.  I think, therefore, that this would be highly damaging to the UNSC and that other permanent members of the group would block or seek to block US triggering, or would issue statements that contradict the terms of snapback and create legal confusion.

It is a very difficult and unanticipated situation.

Suppose President Trump can refer to the trigger mechanism. Do you think he can snap back the Iran sanctions? Will UNSC agree with him?

As I said, he may be able to, but I think that the credibility of this decision would be immediately impugned and that would damage implementation of the sanctions to come.

EU is trying to save JCPOA but they do not do anything for it. They just send some political statement. This did not lead to economic benefit for Iran, INSTEX is an example of this. Do you think they can save JCPOA according to Iran’ new paces?

No.  The EU’s efforts are laudable but I do not believe they will be sufficient to help Iran’s leaders justify to themselves staying within the JCPOA.

That said, it remains in Iran’s interest to abide by the JCPOA and avoid fueling this crisis.  Expanding the nuclear program will not help manage that problem nor will it necessarily improve the atmosphere for negotiations to reduce tensions.

I understand why Iran is doing what it is doing to react and retaliate against the United States.  But, I don’t agree with it nor think it is helpful, any more than the US decision to withdraw from the JCPOA and impose sanctions was.

According to new development, do you think the JCPOA will survive?

I have been consistent in my view that the JCPOA cannot survive so many different pressures and attacks, especially from the two core states with obligations under it: Iran and the United States.

I cannot predict if and when it will formally die.  But, as an agreement that provides for real redress of serious concerns in the two countries and avoids a crisis, it is already functionally dead.

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