Iran’s Permanent Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Reza Najafi said that “the core problem” obstructing the realization of NPT is “the unilateral nuclear actions and policies” of US.

The Iranian senior diplomat made the remarks on Tuesday while addressing the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

“Now, we are only two years away from the fifties anniversary of the entry into force of the Treaty. Yet, the achievement of the nuclear disarmament objective appears as far away today as it was in 1970 and even further because of the actions and policies of nuclear weapon States, particularly those by the United States of America,” reiterated the Iranian envoy to Vienna putting blame on US government.

Here comes the full text of his address:

Mr. Chair,

I would like to congratulate you on your assumption of the Chairmanship of this Preparatory Committee and thank you and your team for conducting consultations in preparing this session. My delegation assures you of our support and we look forward to working with you and with all delegations in this session.

I also extend my warm congratulations to my friend and brother, Ambassador Muhammad Shahrul Ikram Yaakob from Malaysia on his election as Chairman of the third session of the Preparatory Committee. I wish to associate my delegation with the statement of the Non-Aligned Movement delivered by the distinguished ambassador of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.

Safeguarding the security of peoples through eliminating the threats posed by the world’s most dangerous weapons was the main objective of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Maintaining the Treaty’s credibility and legitimacy depends on the attainment of this objective.

Now, we are only two years away from the fifties anniversary of the entry into force of the Treaty. Yet, the achievement of the nuclear disarmament objective appears as far away today as it was in 1970 and even further because of the actions and policies of nuclear weapon States, particularly those by the United States of America.

The nuclear-weapon States continue to retain thousands of nuclear weapons. They continue to emphasize the utility and value of nuclear weapons and some of them have increased the role of these weapons in their security and military policies by assigning new missions to them.

Some of them continue the policy of threat to use such weapons not only in a nuclear exchange but also against non-nuclear-weapons States parties to the NPT. Certain nuclear-weapon States have resumed a new type of nuclear arms race, modernizing their nuclear missiles, submarines and bombers massively, and developing new types of low yield nuclear weapons to use them in regional conflict.

There have been no negotiations, involving the nuclear-weapon States, on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament.

You have already heard the narrative that attributes all these negative trends and the lack of progress towards nuclear disarmament to international security conditions.

The NPT Non-Nuclear Weapon States categorically reject that and believe that the root causes of this situation are disregard for multilateralism; unwillingness to cooperate multilaterally in the attainment of the nuclear disarmament objective through negotiating in good faith a convention or other legal instruments for the elimination of nuclear weapons; the lack of genuine intention and political will to take effective measures to achieve nuclear disarmament; and the persistent non-compliance with nuclear disarmament obligations under article VI of the NPT and the commitments agreed at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences.

The core problem is unilateralism, in particular, the unilateral nuclear actions and policies of the United States of America, which present the gravest threat to the future of the NPT and the objective of nuclear disarmament. As long as this US nuclear policy remains, there will be no progress towards nuclear disarmament, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects is expected to continue.

The US is attempting in vain to convince the NPT States parties that in order to make progress on nuclear disarmament it is necessary to forget and move beyond the existing unequivocal commitments on nuclear disarmament, and instead, recognize the need for creating subjective conditions as preconditions to fulfilling legal obligations on nuclear disarmament. The real intention of such a distorted discourse is to make article VI of the Treaty a dead letter.

There is no doubt that the main focus of the 2020 NPT Review Conference should be the implementation of the unfulfilled commitments on nuclear disarmament. We are of the view that any consensus outcome document of the 2020 Review Conference should not only reaffirm the validity of the commitments made at previous Review Conferences but also include concrete next steps for the implementation of article VI, in particular a call on all the nuclear-weapon States to participate in the urgent negotiation and conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention in the Conference on Disarmament as a matter of the highest priority.

Mr. Chair,

While the exploitation of the devastating potentials of nuclear technology by few countries continues to pose the gravest threat to the humanity, the peaceful applications of nuclear technology have great benefits for humankind.

Enjoying such benefits can be made possible by the exercise of the inalienable right of all States parties to the treaty to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and the full implementation of the undertakings to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Articles III and IV of the NPT through a mix of commitments and rights provide a framework for confidence and cooperation within which the peaceful uses can take place.

Notwithstanding the acceptance and implementation of the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol by the nonnuclear-weapon States, various restrictive measures and initiatives continue to be applied, including through pressure and sanctions, to limit the exercise of the inalienable right of these States to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to participate in peaceful nuclear cooperation.

All States parties have agreed in the context of NPT Review Conferences that in all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment should be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty. In practice, States that are outside the Treaty and possess nuclear weapons appear to have the privilege of getting preferential treatment in nuclear cooperation. We have to discuss these issues at the meetings of the NPT Review Process.

Mr. Chair,

I wish to emphasize that the Islamic Republic of Iran as a steadfast supporter of nuclear disarmament is equally committed to nuclear nonproliferation. Based on this commitment, Iran has been at the forefront of the efforts to achieve the universality of the NPT, particularly in the Middle East.

Nuclear weapons in the hands of the Israeli regime, which has a long and dark record of aggression, occupation and the committing of war crimes, poses a serious threat to the security of the non-nuclear weapon States in the Middle East and is a source of proliferation in the region.

The Israeli regime continues to block all international and regional efforts for realizing the goal of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and in doing so, the United States is fully supporting it, in contravention of its international commitment to undertake all necessary measures aimed at the prompt implementation of the 1995 Resolution.

The 1995 Resolution on the Middle East was an essential and integral element of the outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the basis upon which the Treaty was indefinitely extended without a vote. The States parties to the Treaty must take into account that the persistent failure in implementing the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East would have unintended consequences.

Israel’s nuclear weapons program is the result of the application of double standards by certain nuclear-weapon States, in particular the United States and their failing to abide by the very non-proliferation norm that they are legally committed to comply with and invariably enforce. We have consistently urged that the non-proliferation norm should be applied globally and without exception.

Mr. Chair,

Iran’s persistent commitment and contribution to nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation cause did not cease even when a fabricated crisis inflicted huge trouble on my country and adversely affected peace a few years ago. We managed to surpass that unnecessary crisis through painstaking negotiations which resulted in the JCPOA, a diplomatic negotiated solution and historical success of multilateral diplomacy.

The vital importance of the JCPOA as a model for resolution of technically and politically complex issues has been widely acknowledged. That is why the international community has been steadfast in its support for the implementation of the JCPOA.

While Iran has fully implemented its commitments under the JCPOA during the past three years, as confirmed by the IAEA reports ten times since January 2016, the United States, a participant in the JCPOA, has continually violated the term of the agreement including through actions aimed at coercing other participants to renege their undertakings.

The United States shall be held accountable for its irresponsible policies and actions which constitute not only the violation of a multilaterally negotiated deal but also that of a consensus based UN Security Council resolution. We call on the United States to cease violating its JCPOA commitments and to implement them fully.
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The US administration has blatantly declared an ultimatum to certain JCPOA participants for one-sided alteration of the deal’s provisions. Our response to that threat is clear and firm: No, the JCPOA will not be renegotiated or altered.

The US will be responsible for any consequences of its reckless policies against the JCPOA. The US policy on the JCPOA sends an unambiguous message to others that the US is not a reliable party in any bilateral or multilateral agreement and it can’t be trusted.

Mr. Chair,

In order to have a successful Review Process of the Treaty, the status of implementation of all provisions of the Treaty across its three pillars should be assessed and reviewed in a balanced manner, but the current situation with regard to stalemate on nuclear disarmament front can’t be ignored.

This situation requires greater attention to the urgent need for the implementation of the nuclear disarmament commitments. It is not hard to see that the future of the Treaty depends primarily on the implementation of article VI by nuclear weapons States. We should spare no efforts in ensuring the full and effective implementation of the Treaty as the best way to preserve the credibility and longevity of this fundamental instrument.”

“The implementation of the commitments of other sides to the JCPOA, in particular the United States is unacceptable. Indeed, by limiting Iran’s benefits from the deal the US Government in contradiction with both letter and spirit of the agreement has taken a negative approach to undermine “successful implementation” of the JCPOA,” he noted.

Following is the full text of his statement:

In the Name of God

The Compassionate and the Merciful

Mr. Chairman, Director General, Distinguished Colleagues,

(At the outset, I would like to express my government’s appreciation to those delegations that either by their presence in our embassy or during this meeting extended their sympathy and condolences to the families of the victims of the sad event of recent earthquake.)

Mr. Chairman,

My delegation once more would like to express its appreciation to the Agency’s Secretariat for its efforts on the monitoring and verification of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

As we have stated from the start of negotiations on the JCPOA and then its implementation, reciprocal and full implementation of the measures by all parties, including by E3/EU+3 is the crucial basis of the JCPOA and is the indispensable element of the agreement for its sustainability.

For our part, since the Implementation Day, we have honored our commitments under the JCPOA and the Agency’s reports on verification and monitoring of JCPOA in Iran for the ninth time provides clear evidence to such commitment. However, the implementation of the commitments of other sides to the JCPOA, in particular the United States is unacceptable. Indeed, by limiting Iran’s benefits from the deal the US Government in contradiction with both letter and spirit of the agreement, particularly paragraphs 26, 28 and 29 of the JCPOA, has taken a negative approach to undermine “successful implementation” of the JCPOA. The US non-compliance with its commitments under the JCPOA has not only undermined this international agreement but also has put the US credibility for any international deal under serious question.

The JCPOA has provided for the full lifting of all UNSC sanctions and all unilateral or multilateral nuclear-related sanctions. Furthermore, the E3/EU+3 have an unequivocal responsibility to implement the JCPOA “in good faith and in a constructive atmosphere, based on mutual respect, and to refrain from any action inconsistent with the letter, spirit and intent of the JCPOA that would undermine its successful implementation”. The US should comply with all its obligations under the JCPOA which only deals with nuclear issue.

In the recent visit of the Director General to Iran, our authorities at the highest levels stressed that the JCPOA is not a one-sided road and Iran’s implementation of its commitments can continue if all other parties to the JCPOA continue to implement fully and unconditionally their commitments. Anything other than the good faith implementation is contrary to the letter and spirit of the JCPOA.

Mr. Chairman,

We note that recent updated report (GOV/2017/48), once more demonstrates that Iran’s nuclear program continues within the framework of the JCPOA.

Nonetheless, I would like to reiterate the following points:

As stated before, the JCPOA text on heavy water reads that all excess heavy water which is beyond Iran’s needs will be made available for export to the international market based on international prices and delivered to the international buyer for 15 years. That is the only commitment Iran has in this regard.

We would like to stress, once more, that the report should be as concise as possible and stay away from mentioning avoidable detailed information, particularly it should not contain any confidential Safeguards information

We would also like to restate our observation on the definition of “stockpile” and its difference with the term “inventory” and recall that this is a matter of our discussion in the Joint Commission.

My delegation would like to put on record our strong reservation on some new arbitrary interpretations contrary to the clear text of different sections of Annex I of the JCPOA and the history of negotiations on that. The Agency is not in a position to interpret JCPOA. It is exclusively the duty of Joint Commission to do so by consensus. Thus, para 26 of the report is not factually correct and should be rectified.

Before concluding, I would like to refer to few delegations that asked again for disclosure of the raw and detailed confidential safeguards information contrary to the BOG approved mandate. Such request implies that the Agency should not be trusted at all and the Agency itself should be verified again independently. My delegation would like to recall that in addition to the provisions of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Article 5 of the Additional Protocol for protection of confidential information, the JCPOA clearly requests the Agency “to take every precaution to protect commercial, technological and industrial secrets as well as other confidential information coming to its knowledge”. We strongly oppose the inclusion of confidential safeguard information in the any upcoming report under the pretext of more transparency.

For the last speaker before me, as usual you heard an irrelevant statement. For the Zionist regime of Israel that conceals its tens of inhumane nuclear warheads, operates un-safeguarded clandestine nuclear facilities at Dimona that has also leaked radioactive materials to the neighborhood causing the spread of cancer disease to innocent people, a regime that made desperately every effort to prevent the JCPOA conclusion, now astonishingly talking about JCPOA implementation concern is ridiculous. This regime with a history full of aggression and occupation has flagrantly violated all 86 resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council in response to its repeated acts of aggression and illegal occupation, as well as its well-documented atrocities, apartheid policies and war crimes against the Palestinian people. This regime cannot create a disguise for its illegitimate nuclear weapon program, which is a real threat to regional and international peace and security.

Thank you Mr. Chairman