TEHRAN (Iran News) Viewing governance strictly through three branches, conventionalizing the coercive power, failing to regard culture as an integrated power in itself, decentralizing education outside a unified power-based structure, and adopting a livelihood-centered and state-centered approach to the economy have all contributed to state-centric movements. Every few years, these movements have been directed along partisan and factional lines.

Of course, the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran is a synthesis of a monotheistic ontology (God-centered) and a people-based methodology symbolized by republicanism. For this reason, one can observe a certain alignment—within both the written and unwritten lines of the text—with Western liberalism (which is founded upon humanism and anthropocentrism).

Thus, in some principles and concepts, similarities and overlaps with the values of Western liberal democracy can be observed. These commonalities appear mainly in the realm of “methods” and “citizens’ rights.” Entrusting cultural development entirely to the government without consistent supervision over its content and direction, or assigning education to the executive branch without aligning it with the necessities of the Revolution and national governance, as well as adopting a partisan and ideologically tinted approach to the economy—alongside pure capitalism without a focus on justice—have over the years led to the politicization of culture along factional lines, fragmentation of non-aligned educational content, and the emergence of a wealthy elite class immersed in affluence. This economic model has consistently created challenges across all sectors.

We remain committed to principles within this Constitution; yet instead of giving primacy to these principles in overarching content and expecting governments to pave the way for substantive implementation, we have made the executive administrator the very foundation of content itself.

Let us consider the following principles:

A – Popular Sovereignty and Republicanism

(Similar to Democracy)

Western liberalism emphasizes popular sovereignty and the social contract. In the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, this concept is embodied in the republican nature of the system:

Article 6:

“In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the affairs of the country must be administered by reliance on public opinion, through elections: the election of the President, representatives of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, members of councils, and the like.”

Article 56:

“Absolute sovereignty over the world and humanity belongs to God, and it is He who has made man master of his own social destiny. No one can deprive man of this divine right…”

Although these principles are defined within a religious framework, in terms of their popular character and recourse to public opinion, they correspond with the democratic mechanisms of Western liberalism.

B – Fundamental Freedoms

(Similar to Liberalism)

Freedom is the core of liberalism. In Chapter Three (Rights of the Nation), the Constitution refers to a wide range of freedoms similar to those set forth in international charters (influenced by liberalism):

Article 23:

The investigation of beliefs is forbidden, and “no one may be molested or taken to task simply for holding a certain belief.”

Article 24:

Freedom of the press is guaranteed, “unless it is detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islam or the rights of the public.”

Article 27:

Freedom of assembly and marches is permitted, “provided that arms are not carried and that they are not detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islam.”

Article 22:

The dignity, life, property, rights, residence, and occupation of individuals are inviolable.

C – Human Rights and Human Dignity

(Shared Concepts)

Research indicates that in certain respects, the Constitution aligns with human rights positions (which have roots in liberalism):

Articles 19–21:

Equality of individuals before the law, observance of women’s rights, and protection of mothers.

Article 32:

The right to legal recourse and judicial security (arrests must be made according to law).

Article 38:

Torture for the purpose of extracting confessions is forbidden.

These principles display relative harmony with the liberal view of inherent human rights (regardless of gender, race, or religion).

D – Rejection of Domination and Independence

(Similar to Anti-Colonial Principles)

Interestingly, some principles of foreign policy in the Constitution (such as Articles 152 and 154) bear semantic resemblance to the outlook of early Iranian liberals during the Constitutional era, who sought to reject foreign domination and preserve independence. Although these principles are rooted in the Islamic concept of rejecting subjugation, in terms of “independence and freedom from foreign powers,” they share common ground with nationalist liberal ideals.

A General View

In an overall assessment, the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran shares similarities with liberalism in its instrumental and procedural aspects:

The use of voting and elections

Recognition of conditional freedoms

Respect for citizens’ rights

However, at the level of foundations, the difference is fundamental. In Western liberalism, human autonomy is the source of rights, whereas in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, divine authority forms the basis of action, and people’s rights are defined within the framework of Islamic criteria (Article 4).

In other words, in liberalism, freedom is unlimited unless it harms another person; but in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, freedom is limited by adherence to Islamic principles under the authority and supervision of a qualified Islamic jurist.

The post A Look at the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran appeared first on Iran News Daily.

TEHRAN (Iran News) The Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization is a specialized and permanent body within the framework of the United Nations.

Regarding its history, the Committee was established in 1974—five years before the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran—by the United Nations General Assembly.

Its formation stemmed from two separate initiatives in the late 1960s: one proposal by Colombia to review the Charter, and another by Romania to strengthen the role of the United Nations. These two tracks ultimately led to the creation of an Ad Hoc Committee, which in 1975 was transformed into the present Special Committee.

The Committee’s primary mission is to carefully examine proposals by Member States aimed at improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the commitments and decisions of the United Nations. However, such reviews must always take place within the framework of the United Nations Charter. In other words, the Committee seeks ways to better implement the provisions of the Charter and strengthen the Organization’s role in key areas.

Its responsibilities include:

Reviewing proposals and views of countries concerning the United Nations Charter.

Examining ways to strengthen the UN’s role in maintaining international peace and security, developing cooperation among nations, and promoting the rules of international law.

Compiling a list of proposals submitted and identifying those that enjoy broader support.

As the only permanent committee dedicated specifically to Charter-related matters, it holds special importance. Among the most significant issues on its agenda are:

Maintaining international peace and security: examining various aspects to strengthen the UN’s role.

Promoting methods such as negotiation, mediation, and international arbitration.

Reviewing the effects of Security Council sanctions on third countries and exploring ways to assist them.

Updating the Organization’s records and supervising the preparation and revision of two important sources: Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs and Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, which function as the institutional memory of the Organization.

According to official UN reports, the Islamic Republic of Iran has consistently maintained an active presence in this Committee. Iran has not only participated as a member but has often represented the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), articulating the views of this large group of countries. For example, during the 71st (2016) and 72nd (2017) sessions of the General Assembly, Iran’s representative was identified as the spokesperson of the Non-Aligned Movement. This selection reflects other Member States’ trust in Iran’s legal diplomacy.

Now, Iran’s election as Vice-Chair and member of the Bureau indicates that at the Committee’s most recent session in New York, the Islamic Republic of Iran was chosen for these leadership roles. Such appointments within UN diplomacy carry significant weight and signify a more influential role for Iran in guiding the Committee’s agenda, facilitating negotiations, and setting priorities.

At the same time, this achievement demonstrates the country’s high level of expertise and diplomatic capacity in the field of international law, as recognized by other nations. Membership in the Bureau provides Iran with an opportunity to more effectively defend its interests and those of like-minded countries regarding key issues such as UN structural reform, the clarification of states’ lawlessness—particularly the United States’ use of sanctions—and peaceful settlement of disputes.

In committees such as the Special Committee on the Charter, members of the Bureau (including the Chair, Vice-Chairs, and Rapporteur) are generally elected by consensus, following informal consultations among regional groups. In other words, there is no formal recorded vote in which one can identify which countries voted “yes” for Iran.

Iran’s election therefore indicates that during consultations, there was no opposition from Member States. Moreover, under current circumstances—when the Trump administration seeks to further discredit the United Nations—this selection was accompanied by implicit approval and collective support of nations, reflecting the political significance and the underlying views of countries regarding Iran.

It should be acknowledged, however, that the primary reason for this collective agreement also lies in Iran’s active and constructive role within the Committee. Iran has a longstanding record of representing the Non-Aligned Movement as its spokesperson in Committee sessions. This diplomatic and legal capability has earned the confidence of other countries and convinced them that Iran can effectively contribute to guiding the Committee’s agenda.

Bureau positions in such committees are typically held for a one-year term, corresponding to the working year of the General Assembly, which begins each September. These terms are renewable, subject to consensus and agreement at the Committee’s subsequent annual meeting. Therefore, for Iran to retain this position next year, it must once again receive Member States’ approval.

The Impact of the Special Committee on the Charter

The Special Committee plays a subtle, specialized, and foundational role within the UN system. Its influence can be analyzed in several key areas:

1. A Platform for Safeguarding the Rule of Law

The Committee’s most important function is providing a specialized forum for interpreting and implementing the United Nations Charter accurately. At a time when the international order faces serious challenges, this Committee serves as a legal platform where fundamental principles—such as sovereign equality of states, prohibition of the use of force, and peaceful settlement of disputes—are supported and examined by experts.

In other words, by promoting these principles, the Committee contributes to strengthening the rule of law and preserving the credibility of the international legal system.

2. A Forum for Reviewing and Proposing Reforms

The Committee’s main mission is to review Member States’ proposals aimed at improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the United Nations within the framework of the Charter. This means that any idea for reforming UN structures or working methods undergoes preliminary legal examination in this Committee before further action.

Recently, António Guterres has issued warnings regarding the efficiency of the United Nations. Reform—particularly of the Security Council—remains a recurring and pressing issue in international forums. Although final decisions rest with the General Assembly and the Security Council, much of the preparatory and technical work is carried out in committees such as the Special Committee on the Charter. The Secretary-General has repeatedly emphasized the need for reforms to enhance efficiency, and this Committee is where that necessity is translated into legal language.

3. Institutional Memory of the United Nations

One of the Committee’s vital yet less visible responsibilities is overseeing the preparation and updating of two key documents:

Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs

Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council

These documents serve as the institutional memory of the United Nations, recording precedents in interpreting and applying Charter provisions. They are considered essential and authoritative resources for diplomats, legal scholars, and international judges at the International Court of Justice.

4. An Opportunity for Developing Countries

For countries such as Iran, this Committee provides an important platform to articulate their perspectives—and those of like-minded countries such as the Non-Aligned Movement—on fundamental issues of international law. Participation in the Bureau enables the Islamic Republic of Iran to play a more active role in steering these specialized discussions and to defend principles emphasized in the Charter, such as sovereign equality and non-intervention in domestic affairs, against emerging challenges.

In short, the Committee’s impact may be compared to that of a fundamental jurisprudential or constitutional council within a system. Its decisions may not be directly operational, but it establishes the framework and interpretations that other organs and states consider themselves bound to respect.

The post Iran: Guardian of the United Nations Charter appeared first on Iran News Daily.

TEHRAN (Iran News) With their presence of 35 million people in cities and villages, they firmly and loudly responded to the opponents of the Islamic Republic—who generally advocate for a referendum—and proved that the Islamic system has not had, does not have, and will not have any significant opposition.

Essentially, the opponents of the Islamic Revolution outside Iran can be categorized. Based on available information, these groups mainly consist of small and highly scattered segments.

Some sources divide them into two general categories: political (using peaceful methods such as media and speeches) and armed (using terror and violence). However, a more common classification is based on ideological orientation, which I will address below in order of their level of activity and history.

New secular and constitutionalist coalitions (the most prominent recent group):

Inside and outside the country, they form a community of around one hundred thousand people. The most significant development has been the gathering of various factions of these tendencies around Reza Pahlavi and the “Solidarity Charter.” They are said to live off money stolen by Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and call for the dissolution of the IRGC and a referendum to change the system. This group represents the oldest segment of the opposition, seeking the return of the Pahlavi rule, with its core based in Los Angeles (such as the Tondar group).

Leftist and communist groups:

Including the Tudeh Party and especially Komala, which is active in Kurdistan. They have recently signed the Solidarity Charter to align with monarchists. Like the monarchists, their numbers do not exceed one hundred thousand. They are often described as deceptive intelligence-linked organizations, although Komala funds some of its activities through its own revenues.

The Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO) (referred to as “Hypocrites”):

The most controversial group. Due to fighting alongside Saddam against the Islamic Republic of Iran during the 1980s, they are considered the most hated group inside Iran and lack any popular base. Although they have been removed from the U.S. and European terrorist lists, their ISIS-like violent approach was reportedly displayed during recent unrest. The seed of hatred planted within them is described as incomprehensible and beyond analysis, and they are accused of brutal behavior toward Iran’s religious and prayer-observing people.

Civil and labor networks:

Including Nobel Prize winner Shirin Ebadi and dozens of small human rights organizations in Europe and the United States, mainly focused on “Woman, Life, Freedom” and justice-seeking efforts. Their numbers are said not to reach even 30,000. They support themselves financially, have media platforms, and have gained influence within party and human rights structures. Their goal is described as misrepresenting the people-oriented path of the system, particularly by relying on feminism.

The Baha’is:

Described as the most organized group opposing the Islamic system, with an almost religious approach. They are said to have their strongest source of cohesion in Israel, with alleged deep Mossad influence. Their establishment is attributed to Britain as a means of ideological confrontation with Shi’ism and to create deviation in Shiite messianic beliefs. They are described as the wealthiest anti-revolutionary movement, with a larger following than the other groups.

Overall, this categorization suggests that foreign intervention has caused ideological divisions among these groups. They are deeply polarized over the issue of supporting military attacks. The majority oppose U.S. and Israeli attacks and the fragmentation of Iran, while a minority (including some monarchists, the MKO, and supporters of Shirin Ebadi) have at times been willing to coordinate with foreign powers against the Islamic Republic.

An important point is that these groups are often highly scattered, lack cohesion, and suffer from mutual distrust. They have no effective connection with developments inside Iran and essentially cannot be called fighters against the system.

Based on this analysis, the Islamic Republic can be considered to lack any significant opposition. If their voices are heard in foreign media and cyberspace, they are mostly seen as advancing the hostility of Western intelligence agencies against our country—something clearly evident to the Iranian nation.

This year, three “Days of God” falling on the 22nd of each month—22 Dey condemning the unrest, 22 Bahman renewing commitment to the ideals of the Islamic Revolution and national solidarity, and, God willing, 22 Esfand on Quds Day—have shown and will continue to show outstanding manifestations of the Iranian nation’s power, disappointing the bloodthirsty enemies of the Iranian people.

The post 22 Bahman This Year Was a Referendum appeared first on Iran News Daily.

TEHRAN (Iran News) The outcome of the three-and-a-half-hour meeting, as presented to public opinion, was described by both sides as “desirable progress.” The very use of the word “desirable” itself gave rise to several concerns.

First – Confidentiality versus Transparency:

There is a specific international standard practice in sensitive negotiations whereby negotiating teams require a secure environment to bargain in order to reach a final framework, protected from media sensationalism and pressure from interest groups.

Domestic critics in Iran have repeatedly criticized the nuclear negotiating team for not publicly announcing certain technical details or side agreements (such as the level of cooperation with the Agency or expanded access). This issue has consistently turned into speculation, investigative reporting, and serious debate in Iran’s internal discussions.

However, it must be noted that confidentiality versus transparency in diplomacy creates a permanent tension between the need for secrecy to ensure successful negotiations and the obligation of transparency toward public opinion.

Negotiating teams usually argue that disclosing step-by-step details can weaken bargaining power.

A large portion of the negotiations concerned technical nuclear issues that were not understandable to the general public and likely required interpretation—ambiguities such as the disastrous experience of the snapback mechanism triggered by an unknown individual named Francesco as a result of the treacherous JCPOA.

Fundamental difference in legal and security status:

The Francesco case is generally defined within the framework of intelligence and security operations. Such cases typically have operational and espionage aspects, and the failure to disclose them in a timely manner often stems from legal violations or espionage concerns.

The main debate inside Iran concerns the transparency of the negotiating team toward governing institutions and the people; otherwise, Muscat or Geneva makes little difference in terms of preserving negotiation objectives.

Second – Concern about the unofficial status of the American team:

This raises the question of why we, too, did not introduce an unofficial team. When negotiations continue with an unofficial team—whose presence in talks of such importance has no documented proof beyond media announcements—while Marco Rubio and Vance, who are official members of Donald Trump’s government, each present their own interpretations of the negotiations in the media, ambiguity is inevitable.

Third – Contradictory signals in the media:

On one hand, we hear about the sensational transfer of warships and aircraft to the region during the negotiations, creating the impression that Iran has come to the negotiating table out of fear and compulsion, speaking under fire. On the other hand, there appears to be a retreat by Trump’s team from all previous propaganda and an acceptance of only one of the twelve previously declared conditions—limited solely to the nuclear issue.

This ambiguous retreat suggests that the American team’s intention may be to buy time and resolve its own domestic issues. Otherwise, what is the meaning of negotiations that are first indirect, second limited solely to the nuclear framework, and third conducted without the presence of official authorities?

Fourth – The authority to lift sanctions:

Everyone knows that lifting a large portion of the sanctions is essentially not within the direct authority of the U.S. government in a way that could serve as a basis for diplomatic bargaining. Before entering the session, the Iranian delegation should have clarified the scope of authority regarding sanctions relief under the Trump administration and brought the nation into alignment on this issue, so that we would not later be accused of negligent bargaining.

During the JCPOA era, the lengthy duration of negotiations led to accusations that the Foreign Ministry team was manufacturing trips for the sake of per diem benefits. Given Abbas Araghchi’s vague remarks after each session, there is concern that once again we may spend another two years in trip after trip, meeting after meeting, turning this chess game into a fruitless exercise and a mental preoccupation for nations both in the region and in Iran.

The Revolutionary Guard’s military maneuvers during the negotiations were a reciprocal response to America’s show of force. Indeed, it was a proper action, and certainly one of the IRGC or Army generals should have been present in the negotiating team so that diplomacy and the battlefield could be presented in a comprehensible balance. This did not happen—perhaps it will in later stages.

Based on past experience, including the JCPOA and these recent sessions, one might conclude that we approach negotiations with optimism, while the enemy pursues them with deceptive intent—using negotiations for the sake of negotiations and to shape the media environment in the domain of soft warfare. Ultimately, if an agreed-upon text is not published, this process could turn into a prolonged chess game marked by media checkmates and public negligence.

An example of such negligence was the revelation of Wendy Sherman’s Jewish identity and Abbas Araghchi’s inattention during the JCPOA negotiations, which portrayed our team as passive.

Sherman, in her book, refers to a sensitive moment during the final days of the Vienna negotiations. According to her account, after hours of exhausting talks and sleeplessness, just when an agreement seemed near, Araghchi once again raised an issue that had previously been settled. Sherman, extremely tired and angry, began shouting at Araghchi. She writes that her anger uncontrollably turned into tears. Sherman was shocked that she had cried in front of the Iranian team, but she believes that this display of sincerity and frustration led Araghchi and his team to retreat from their position.

Psychological operations have been, are, and will remain one of the enemy’s tactics. In conclusion, if I were the one conducting these negotiations, I would most certainly propose—and firmly insist—that the talks remain indirect but be conducted in front of the cameras of one hundred selected journalists from Iran, America, and the region, so that the unforgivable secrecy of the past would not be repeated.

The post Negotiating for the Sake of Negotiation appeared first on Iran News Daily.

TEHRAN (Iran News) The unstable and demagogic president of the United States has recently, in several public statements, warned Iran that a “large fleet” is moving toward the region. He has called for Iran’s immediate return to the negotiating table to reach an agreement on “not having nuclear weapons,” and otherwise has promised more severe consequences. These warnings are issued in the context of previous military operations (such as the operation known as “Midnight Hammer” in June 2025 against Iran’s nuclear facilities).

Despite this highly tense atmosphere, indirect negotiations between the United States and Iran, mediated by Oman, were recently resumed in Oman (February 6, 2026).

Both sides described this round of talks as a “good start” and agreed to hold further discussions in the future.

Key U.S. demands and Iran’s positions

Based on limited news and various reports, U.S. demands and Iran’s responses are outlined as follows:

Complete abandonment of the nuclear weapons program, which appears to be Trump’s main and repeatedly stated red line.

Restrictions on the missile program by limiting the range of Iran’s ballistic missiles.

Cessation of support for so-called proxy groups in the region, including cutting financial and military support to Iran’s Shiite regional allies.

Improvement of the human rights situation and an end to the suppression of domestic protesters.

Iran’s positions and responses:

Limiting the scope of negotiations: Iran has repeatedly stated that it is only willing to negotiate over the nuclear issue for the purpose of lifting sanctions, and considers issues such as the missile program or regional influence to be its own “red lines” and non-negotiable.

Emphasis on the right to peaceful nuclear energy: Iran has always stressed that its nuclear program has been exclusively for peaceful purposes and that it has never sought to build nuclear weapons.

Now, in order to understand these statements, attention should be paid to several important historical turning points:

In 2018, the previous U.S. administration unilaterally withdrew from the Comprehensive Joint Plan of Action (JCPOA) and reinstated severe sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

In June 2025, the United States announced that it had attacked three key Iranian nuclear facilities (Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan) and claimed that this operation had severely weakened Iran’s nuclear capabilities.

The United States, the United Kingdom, and the Zionist regime, by hiring mercenaries from the MEK (Monafeqin), Komala, and PJAK, laid the groundwork for riots aimed at overthrowing the system in Iran on (18 and 19 Dey 1404), resulting in the deaths of more than 3,000 people and the destruction of 350 mosques, libraries, cultural and religious centers, and banks.

At present, the negotiations in Oman are progressing in a favorable manner, and there is hope that they will continue and lead to fruitful results.

Trump needed these negotiations in order to escape the deadlock of laying the groundwork for war—at least in the media space—and the pressure of the opposing party in the United States.

Iran also viewed these negotiations as paving the way for changing the domestic paradigm of fear of war and altering the atmosphere.

Now, with these expectations from both sides, the Muscat meeting can be evaluated as a step toward changing the psychological and emotional conditions of the entire region. And, of course, it remains to be seen what axes the process will construct next week for the white and black houses of this chessboard.

The post Military Pressure in Negotiation appeared first on Iran News Daily.

TEHRAN (Iran News) According to media reports, the goal of this ceasefire is to create space for sending humanitarian aid and to begin sustainable peace negotiations based on a roadmap prepared by the Quadrilateral Committee. Trump personally committed to intervening in this crisis after meeting with the Saudi Crown Prince and described it as “the most violent place on Earth.”

Alongside these diplomatic efforts, the Trump administration expanded travel restrictions to the United States in December 2025. This national security decision is not directly related to the peace objectives in Sudan. According to this order, Sudan remains on the list of countries whose citizens face complete entry restrictions to the U.S.

South Sudan has been added to the list of countries under “full restrictions.” The stated reasons include a high rate of visa violations (e.g., 26.09% for student visas) and the government’s lack of cooperation in repatriating deportable citizens from the U.S.

These restrictions are generally imposed due to security concerns about the ability to “screen” travelers from countries with low stability or unreliable identification documents. To understand the necessity of these peace efforts, it is useful to look at the depth of the disaster:

This civil war has been ongoing since April 2023 between the Sudanese army, led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemedti”). International organizations consider Sudan the largest displacement and humanitarian crisis in the world.

Millions of people have been displaced, and the hunger crisis is spreading catastrophically. Despite these efforts, experts see major obstacles to sustainable peace. Reports indicate Israeli regime support for the RSF, led by the UAE, and support for the Sudanese army by Egypt and Turkey. The success of the U.S. plan may require pressure on the UAE to stop its support, which is extremely complex behind the scenes due to political reasons and the demands of the Israeli regime.

Historical patterns of Sudanese leaders show that they often seek a ceasefire after defeat and think about continuing the war to consolidate their vision in society after victory. According to reports of the dire conditions of the people, even if a ceasefire is established, there is a serious lack of funding to save lives and stabilize the situation.

Overall, it seems that the Trump administration, by leveraging its diplomatic influence and cooperating with Arab allies, is apparently seeking to play an effective role in stopping the war in Sudan, accessing potential economic resources, and preventing Sudan from joining the “Axis of Resistance.” However, the success of these efforts depends on many complex internal and regional factors.

The post Khartoum and Washington: Worlds Apart appeared first on Iran News Daily.

TEHRAN (Iran News) For better understanding, the table below shows the main components of the government’s general budget:

General government budget

General resources: 5,220 billion new rials

Dedicated revenues of ministries: 734 billion new rials. Of course, the above figures pertain only to the general government budget and do not include the budgets of state-owned companies or the collective expenditure section.

Key and analytical points about the budget

Drafting the budget on the basis of the new currency unit is accompanied by significant policy changes:

Contractionary policy: Analyses show that this budget has a contractionary nature, such that the growth of its expenditures relative to high inflation is estimated to be very low (around 5 percent).

Impact on livelihoods: It is predicted that the 20 percent increase in the salaries of employees and retirees will not be in line with current and forecast inflation (above 50 percent) and will undoubtedly lead to a reduction in their purchasing power.

Tax changes: A significant increase in tax revenues (around 63 percent) and an increase in the value-added tax rate to 12 percent could have an inflationary effect on the prices of goods and services.

Removal of the preferential exchange rate: In the new budget, the preferential exchange rate of 28,500 tomans has been removed, and the exchange rate used for customs calculations has been increased (for example, each euro has been calculated as equivalent to 103 new rials).

Public reaction and security concerns: Many people and experts consider the removal of zeros from the currency, without fundamentally controlling inflation, to be a superficial measure and a kind of amusement meant to occupy people’s minds, and they are concerned that without essential economic reforms, this action will be repeated again and again in the future.

Now, with the government’s decision, it is expected that next year monetary and financial markets will enter a new space, and newly printed banknotes will gradually be introduced into the market so that, over a five-year process, the new currency unit becomes dominant in the country’s economy.

People’s engagement with inflation, contractionary policy, zero percent growth, and the appearance of the new currency can, to some extent, cause the core issue—namely, the direction in which the economy is moving—to be reviewed in hidden and unspoken layers of the public mind. Woe to behavior in which there is no reflection.

The post The New Currency Unit Is an Amusement appeared first on Iran News Daily.

TEHRAN (Iran News) Of course, this concept goes far beyond a simple translation, because the origin and meaning of this expression are taken from ancient Hindu texts such as the Maha Upanishad. In the original verse it is expressed as follows:

“That which is mine and that which belongs to another—such divisions are made by narrow-minded people. For the magnanimous, the entire world is one family.”

This is similar to what we Iranians know from the universal literature of Saadi: Human beings are members of a whole, In creation of one essence and soul.

The phrase is composed of three Sanskrit parts:

Vasudha — meaning “the earth” or “the world”

Eva — meaning “indeed” or “certainly”

Kutumbakam — meaning “family”

This slogan represents the core of the philosophy of “unity in diversity” and emphasizes that all of humanity, regardless of nationality, race, or religion, is interconnected and related.

It promotes global brotherhood, cooperation, and shared responsibility for the well-being of planet Earth.

In its contemporary application, this phrase was chosen as the slogan of India’s presidency of the G20 in 2023, under the title “One Earth, One Family, One Future,” emphasizing the need for global cooperation to address challenges such as climate change and sustainable development.

The national symbolism of this verse— from which the phrase is derived— has also been engraved in the entrance hall of the Indian Parliament, indicating its importance as a moral and social message.

Therefore, “Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam” is not merely a literary translation, but a powerful philosophical vision that promotes unity, peace, and collective responsibility. Naturally, this slogan stands in opposition to unilateralism, colonialism, and Western exploitation, and by emphasizing a familial view of the world, it promotes the theory of multilateralism to which Asia today adheres.

The post “Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam” The World Is One Family appeared first on Iran News Daily.

TEHRAN (Iran News) The official view of the Islamic Republic toward the performance and positions of this party indicates that their fundamental deviations from the system’s ideological outlook are completely Western-oriented, and that their mode of struggle has been parliamentarian.

In this regard, sources close to principlist currents and supporters of the system have raised serious criticisms against the Freedom Movement and consider it a current deviating from the main line of the Revolution. From the perspective of these sources, the main deviations of this party include the following:

First, the intellectual foundations of the Freedom Movement are not compatible with Pure Muhammadan Islam and the official interpretation of Imam Khomeini (may he rest in peace) and the Islamic Republic system, and it adopts a completely extreme nationalist approach in opposition to Islamism.

Second, this party has been accused of lack of commitment to Velayat-e Faqih (Guardianship of the Jurist), attempts to establish relations with the United States in the early days of the Revolution, obstruction of the revolutionary path, and misleading the youth.

The main reference for this viewpoint is Imam Khomeini’s letter in 1987, in which he explicitly speaks of the “deviations of the Freedom Movement” and even considers its harm greater than that of other groups.

Statements have also been نقل (quoted) from the Supreme Leader emphasizing the betrayal and attachment of some elements of the Provisional Government to America.

On the other hand, the Freedom Movement presents itself as a “national–religious” party and a supporter of Islamic democracy.

In the official charter of this party, emphasis is placed on being Muslim, being Iranian, supporting constitutionalism, and remaining loyal to Mossadegh’s legacy.

Its bylaws also explicitly stress defending the foundations of the Revolution and the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran and striving to realize the principal ideals of the Revolution.

This party played a historical role in the struggle against the Pahlavi regime as well as in forming the Provisional Government after the Revolution, and it counts founders such as Mehdi Bazargan and Ayatollah Seyyed Mahmoud Taleghani among its record.

However, at present this party is not recognized by the Islamic Republic, and its activities in the country have been declared illegal.

The main محور (axis) of tension between the Freedom Movement and the official reading of the Islamic Republic system lies here: one side emphasizes nationalism and democracy with an ostensibly religious flavor, while the other insists on Pure Islam, Velayat-e Faqih, and anti-arrogance (anti-imperialism) as the foundations of the Revolution. Thus, from the perspective of official institutions, the conflict has largely taken shape based on this theoretical disagreement as well as the performance of the Provisional Government led by Engineer Mehdi Bazargan—especially regarding the issue of bypassing Imam Khomeini (may he rest in peace) and establishing relations with the United States in the meeting with Brzezinski in Algiers.

Attention to the fact that their way of thinking led to the separation of the Mojahedin-e Khalq, with their pendulum-like stance, raises doubts about the consistency between words and actions.

If we consider the criterion for struggle against the monarchical regime to be both anti-despotism and anti-imperialism, then this party has certainly lacked an anti-colonial outlook.

And without concern, and with clarity, the angle of their divergence is understandable and even measurable.

The post Freedom Movement, Aligned with America appeared first on Iran News Daily.

TEHRAN (Iran News) With the holding of parliamentary elections and the process of forming a new parliament scheduled for December 29, 2025, it is natural that the selection of the executive branch will extend into 2026.

The traditional ethno-sectarian balance in Iraq has, based on an unwritten convention since 2003, allocated the position of prime minister to a Shiite, the speakership of parliament to a Sunni, and the presidency to a Kurd.

Election results and ongoing negotiations indicate that Iraq’s future political composition will be shaped around several main axes. Given that no single party or coalition has secured the required majority (165 out of 329 seats), the formation of a government will necessitate broad coalition-building among Shiite, Kurdish, and Sunni groups. Nevertheless, the Shiite Coordination Framework—an alliance composed of the main Shiite parties—holds a total of 187 seats and, under the constitution, has the right to nominate a candidate for the post of prime minister. As such, it will be a key actor in Iraq’s governance.

Both the United States and Iran exert influence over Iraq’s political process. Washington seeks the selection of a prime minister who maintains distance from Iranian influence and from affiliated paramilitary groups. On the other hand, parties close to Iran wield significant influence within the Coordination Framework—an influence that the United States views as an obstacle to the continuation of its presence in Iraq.

Meanwhile, a new Sunni alliance is taking shape, as major Sunni parties have formed a united “National Political Council” to strengthen their bargaining position. At the same time, the two main Kurdish parties—the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)—have yet to reach an agreement on a single candidate for the presidency.

The United States is also paying attention to these two Kurdish currents, hoping that through engagement it might arrange the conditions for sustaining its presence in Iraq.

Many analysts assess Iraq’s political future within the context of continuity along the axis of resistance and consider the prospect of a darker future for the United States in Iraq to be inevitable. The Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq share inseparable pillars in their relations, which do not tolerate the presence of foreign powers in the region. Although obstacles exist in both countries—such as Western-oriented perspectives—that challenge this path, these ties remain fundamental.

The post U.S.’s View of Iraq appeared first on Iran News Daily.